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Abstract
Using a structural life-cycle model, we quantify the long-term impact of school closures
during the Corona crisis on children affected at different ages and coming from households
with different parental characteristics. In the model, public investment through schooling
is combined with parental time and resource investments in the production of child human
capital at different stages in the children’s development process. We quantitatively charac-
terize both the long-term earnings consequences on children from a Covid-19 induced loss
of schooling, as well as the associated welfare losses. Due to self-productivity in the human
capital production function, skill attainment at a younger stage of the life cycle raises skill
attainment at later stages, and thus younger children are hurt more by the school closures
than older children. We find that parental reactions reduce the negative impact of the
school closures, but do not fully offset it. The negative impact of the crisis on children’s
welfare is especially severe for those with parents with low educational attainment and low
assets. The school closures themselves are primarily responsible for the negative impact
of the Covid-19 shock on the long-run welfare of the children, with the pandemic-induced
income shock to parents playing a secondary role.
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1 Introduction
Governments worldwide have reacted to the Covid-19 pandemic by closing schools and child care
centers. In many countries, including the US, these closures started in mid March, extended to
the summer, and governments and local officials are now wrestling with the question whether
to bring children physically back to school in the fall. Whereas the economic consequences of
temporary business closures are immediate and drew a lot of media and policy attention, the
economic consequences of school and child care closures arise in the longer term and are not
easily measured. Given the importance of human capital for individual prosperity and long-term
macroeconomic growth, they are however likely substantial (see e.g. Krueger and Lindahl (2001),
Manuelli and Seshadri (2014)).
In this paper, we analyze the long-term income-, welfare- and distributional consequences of
the school and child care closures on the affected children. The key dimensions of heterogeneity
we focus on are the age of a child in 2020 (when the school closures happened), as well as
parental socio-economic characteristics, primarily financial resources and education. To do so, we
build a heterogeneous agent partial equilibrium model with a human capital production function
at its core that takes time and monetary inputs by parents and governmental investment into
schooling as inputs. Parents also leave inter vivos transfers to their children, which can be used to
finance college and consumption. We model school and child care closures as a reduction in the
governmental investment in children corresponding to six fewer months of schooling. In the model,
parents endogenously adjust their investment into children and inter vivos transfers in response
to the drop in governmental inputs, thereby potentially mitigating the adverse consequences of
Covid-19-induced school closures. We use our model as a quantitative laboratory to analyze
the long-term aggregate and distributional consequences of the Covid school shock on children’s
human capital as they progress through their school ages, their high-school graduation and college
choice, their labor market earnings, and, ultimately, their welfare. In an extended analysis,
in addition to the school closures, we also model a negative income shock to parents due to
the Covid-induced economic recession. The reduction in economic resources of parents in turn
adversely impacts their ability to invest into their children and endow them with inter vivos
transfers to attend college, and therefore aggravates the school closure-induced shock. We view
the results of this last thought experiment as our main, model-based predictions of the long-run
economic consequences of the Covid-19 crisis on the current generation of school children.
The key quantitative ingredients for the quantitative analysis are the parameters characterizing
the human capital production function, which we either take from the literature or calibrate it
to data moments on parental investments into children from U.S. household micro data. Once
the model is parametrized, we subject children and parents to a one-time, unexpected Covid-19
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school closure shock and possibly an associated, recession-induced income shock and document
the short- and long run economic consequences. On average (across children aged 4 to 14 when
the shock occurs), the model implies an increase in the future share of children without a high
school degree of 3.8% and a reduction of the share of children with a college degree of 2.7%
when both school closures and the economic recession is taken into account. On average, the
earnings losses induced by reduced human capital accumulation and lower educational attainment
amount to about −1%. These effects materialize despite a significant endogenous adjustment
of parental investments into their children: time inputs rise by 4.29% and monetary inputs by
4.99%. Measured as consumption-equivalent variation, the average welfare loss of children from
the (deep but highly temporary) Covid schooling and parental income shock amounts to −0.75%,
with 87% of losses being directly attributed to the school closures, and the rest being accounted
for by the economic recessions for the children’s parents. Given the temporary nature of the
shock, assumed to last only half a year, we view these numbers as quite large.
Furthermore, these averages mask substantial heterogeneity by the age and parental socio-
economic characteristics of the children at the time of the crisis. Turning first to the age of the
child, the adverse impact is most pronounced for younger children of school age (i.e. children of
ages 6-10). The welfare losses of children aged 6 at the time of the crisis amount to −1% in
terms of consumption-equivalent variation. Even though parents respond strongly to the closure
of schools by increasing their time and resource inputs into the child human capital production
function, they do not quite fully offset the reduction in public inputs due to schooling. This implies
that children arrive at older ages with less human capital due to the Covid crisis, and since the
human capital production function features dynamic complementarities, the marginal productivity
of private investments at future ages is reduced. Optimizing parents respond to this by investing
less into their children at older ages (relative to the pre-Covid scenario), leading to lower human
capital at age 16, adverse outcomes on high-school completion and college attendance, future
wages and, consequently, welfare. Older children at the time of the Covid crisis, instead, have
already accumulated most of their human capital, and therefore the adverse future incentive effect
on parental human capital investment due to Covid school closures is less severe.
Although the age of the child is the strongest determinant of the negative impact of the Covid
shock on human capital accumulation, wages and welfare, parental background matters as well.
Broadly speaking, children with poorer parents suffer more. There are two reasons for this. First,
even without any parental adjustments in investments, children from lower income households
suffer more from the school closures, since for them a larger part of educational investment
comes from the government. Second, as a reaction to the school closures, rich parents increase
their investment into children by more than poor parents. They have more financial resources to
do so, and their children have on average higher human capital. Given that the human capital
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production function features dynamic complementarity, rich parents thus have higher incentives to
compensate the reduction in government investment than poor parents. Lower college attendance
rates are an important driver of welfare losses, and college-educated parents are able to mitigate
the adverse effect of school closures better, leading to lower welfare losses for their children.
At the other end of the spectrum, college attendance rates are already very low for children
from the most disadvantaged backgrounds even before the Covid-19 crisis. Therefore, children
of high school educated parents (who have sizeable college completion rates prior to the shock)
experience the largest welfare losses, exceeding those for children of high school dropout parents,
with and children from college educated parents experiencing the least adverse effects.
1.1 Related Literature
This paper ties into the literature on schooling and human capital formation. Our human capital
production function relies on Cunha et al. (2006), Cunha and Heckman (2007) and Cunha et al.
(2010), especially on the feature of self-productivity, i.e., higher human capital in one period leads
to higher human capital in the next period, and dynamic complementarity, i.e., human capital
investment pay out more the higher the human capital.1 This feature implies that early-childhood
education is a crucial determinant of future income (Cunha and Heckman (2007) and Caucutt and
Lochner (2020)). Consequently, public schooling is a driver of intergenerational mobility. Relying
on quantitative models, Kotera and Seshadri (2017) show that differences in intergenerational
mobility across US states can be explained by differences in public school finances. Related,
Lee and Seshadri (2019) find that education subsidies can significantly increase intergenerational
mobility.
Whereas the quantitative literature focuses on the effects of public schooling investment
on children’s outcomes and intergenerational mobility, there exists an empirical literature that
analyzes specifically the link between school instruction time and outcomes of children. Lavy
(2015) exploits international differences in school instruction time, caused by differences in the
length of an average school day and usual school weeks, and finds that school instruction time in
core subjects significantly affects testing outcomes of children. Similarly, Carlsson et al. (2015)
exploit exogenous variation in testing dates in Sweden and report that extra 10 days of school
instruction raise scores on intelligence tests by 1% of a standard deviation.2 There are few studies
investigating longer-term outcomes of school instruction time on children. Cortes et al. (2015)
find a positive effect of math instruction time on the probability of attending college for low-
1Our human capital production function does not feature innate ability, only innate human capital, and
therefore by construction does not include complementarity between ability and human capital investment.
2Other papers studying the link between school instruction time and test scores are Rivkin and Schimann
(2015) and Fitzpatrick et al. (2011).
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performing students. Pischke (2007) exploits short school years associated with a shift in the
school starting date in Germany in the 1960s, and finds no significant effects on employment
and earnings of affected children. Jaume and Willén (2019) find that half a year less instruction
time during primary school caused by school strikes in Argentina lowers the long-term earnings
by 3.2% for men and 1.9% for women.
The remainder of this paper unfolds as follows. Section 2 presents the model, and Section 3
its calibration. Sections 4, 5, and 6 then discuss the results, first in terms of aggregate effects,
then in terms of its distribution, before inspecting the mechanisms that give rise to them. Section
7 analyzes the scenarios of longer school closures and a longer recession, both lasting one year
instead of half a year. Last, section 8 concludes, and the Appendix contains further details about
the data used, theoretical properties of the model, as well as additional quantitative results.
2 A Quantitative Model of Education During the Epi-
demic
We now describe the quantitative life cycle model that we will use to quantify the short- and
long-run consequences of school closures during the COVID-19 pandemic. After setting out the
fundamentals of the economy (demographics, time, risk, endowments, preferences and govern-
ment policy) we immediately focus on the recursive formulation of the model, since this is the
representation we will compute.
2.1 Individual State Variables, Risk, and Economic Decisions
Time in the model is discrete and the current period is denoted by t. We model the life cycle of
one adult and one children generation in partial equilibrium. The timing and events of this life
cycle are summarized in Figure 1 below.
Agents are heterogeneous with respect to the generation they belong to k ∈ {ch, pa}, either
being part of the child or parental generation, and they differ by their marital status m ∈ {si,ma}
for single and married, their age j ∈ {0, . . . , J < ∞}, their asset position a, their current
human capital h, their education level s ∈ {no, hs, co} for no higher education (no high school
completion), high school attendance and completion, college attendance and completion, and
idiosyncratic productivity risk η ∈ {ηl, ηh}, where ηl is low and ηh is high labor productivity. The
individual state variables and the range of values they can take are summarized in Table 1.
We assume that parents give birth to children at the age of jf and denote the fertility rate of
households by ξ(m, s), which differs by marital status and education groups. Notice that ξ(m, s)
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Table 1: State Variables
State Var. Values Interpretation
k k ∈ {ch, pa} Generation
m m ∈ {si,ma} Marital Status
j j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , J} Model Age
a ≥ −a(j, s, k) Assets
h h > 0 Human Capital
s s ∈ {no, hi, co} Education
η η ∈ {ηl, ηh} Productivity Shock
Notes: List of state variables of the economic model.
is also the number of children per household. There is no survival risk and all households live
until age J and thus the cohort size within each generation is constant (and normalized to 1).
We now describe in detail how life unfolds for parents, and then for children, as summarized in
Figure 1 below.
2.1.1 Life of the Parental Generation
Parental households become economically active at age jf just before their children are born.
They start their economic life in marital status m and with education level s, an initial idiosyn-
cratic productivity state η and initial assets a. These initial states are exogenously given to
the household, and drawn from the population distribution Φ(s,m, η, a) which will be informed
directly by the data.
Parents then observe the innate ability (initial human capital) h = h0 of their children which
is drawn from an initial distribution Ψ(h0|s,m) that depends on parental education s and marital
status m. Children live with their parents until age ja (parental age (jf + ja)) at which point
they leave the parental household to form their own household.
During the parental part of the life cycle in which children live with parents (parental age j ∈
{jf , ..., jf + ja}) they invest money im and time it into the accumulation of human capital h of
their children, taking as given public investment into schooling ig. As a result, the human capital
of the child evolves according to
h′ = g
(
j, h, im, it, ig
)
, (1)
where g is a function of the child’s age (to reflect differences in the relative weights of education
inputs at different ages), and depends positively on the three inputs (parental time, parental
resources and public education).
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Figure 1: Life-Cycle of Child and Parental Households
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When children leave the household at parental age jf + ja, parents may transfer additional
monetary resources as inter-vivos transfers b to their children. After this transfer parents and
children separate and there are no further interactions between the two generations.
Throughout the work life parental households spend an exogenous amount of time `(m) > 0
on market work which differs by marital status. Labor productivity and thus individual wages
are determined by an exogenous productivity profile ε(j, s,m) that depends on household age,
education and marital status, as well as by a stochastic shock η. This shock η follows a first-
order Markov chain with state space {ηl, ηh}, transition matrix π (η′ | η) and initial distribution Π.
Current labor income of parents with characteristics j, s,m is then given by
y = w · ε(j, s,m) · η · `(m). (2)
Parents work until retirement at age jr, when they receive lump-sum (but earnings history
dependent) retirement benefits bp > 0, and live until age J . In addition to making human capital
investment decisions for their children when these are present in the household, parents in each
period make a standard consumption-saving choice, where household asset choices are subject to
a potentially binding borrowing constraint a′ ≥ −a(j, s, k), which will be parameterized such that
the model replicates well household debt at the age at which households have children jf . The
borrowing limit is assumed to decline linearly to zero over the life cycle towards the last period
of work at age jr − 1. Table 2 summarizes the choices of parents (and children, as described in
the next subsection).
Table 2: Per Period Decision Variables
State Var. Values Decision Period Interpretation
c c > 0 j ≥ ja Consumption
a′ a′ ≥ −a(j, s, k) j ≥ ja Asset Accumulation
it it ≥ 0 j ∈ {jf , ..., jf + ja} Time Investments
im im ≥ 0 j ∈ {jf , ..., jf + ja} Monetary Investments
b b ≥ 0 j = jf + ja Monetary Inter-vivos Transfer
s s ∈ {no, hi, co} j = ja (Higher) Education
Notes: List of control variables of the economic model.
2.1.2 Life of the Children Generation
Children are born at age j = 0, but for the first ja− 1 periods of their life do not make economic
decisions. Their human capital during these periods evolves as the outcome of parental investment
decisions (im, it) described above. At the beginning of age ja, and based on both the level of
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human capital as well as the financial transfer b from their parents (which determines their initial
wealth a = b), children make a discrete higher education decision s ∈ {no, hs, co}, where s = no
stands in for the choice not to complete high school, hs for high school completion, and co for
college completion, respectively. For simplicity, children are stand-in bachelor households through
their entire life-cycle.
Acquiring a high school or college degree comes at a cost (capturing either a time- or psy-
chological cost) p(s, sp, h) which is decreasing in the child’s acquired human capital h and also
depends on parental education sp. In addition, college education requires a monetary cost ι ≥ 0.
Children may finance some of their college expenses by borrowing, subject to a credit limit
by −a(j, s, k) which is zero for s ∈ {no, hs}, i.e. for individuals not going to college. As was
the case for parents, this limit decreases linearly with age and converges to zero at the age
of retirement jr, requiring the children generation to pay off their student loans prior to their
retirement.
Youngsters who decide not to complete high school, s = no, enter the labor market imme-
diately at age jw(s = no) = ja. Those who decide to complete high school, but not to attend
college, do so at age jw(s = hs) = jh > ja. While at high school, {ja, ..., jh − 1}, they work
part-time at wages of education group s = no. Youngsters who decide to attend college enter
the labor market at jw(s = co) = jc and also work part-time at wages of education group s = no
during their high-school and college years {ja, jc − 1}.
At time of labor market entry, jw(s), the acquired human capital of a worker is mapped into
an idiosyncratic permanent productivity state γ(s, h). When starting to work, children also draw
stochastic productivity η, which follows the same first-order Markov chain as for the parental
generation. Labor income of children during the working period is then given by
w · γ(s, h) · ε(j, s, si) · η · `(si).
Since the children generation does not have any offspring of their own, the remaining decision
problem of the child generation amounts to a simple life-cycle consumption-saving problem.
2.2 Decision Problems
Since we focus on a single parent and children generation, we can solve the model backward,
starting from the dynamic programming problem of the children.
9
2.2.1 Children
The children generation makes their first meaningful economic decision at age ja, when it leaves
the parental household with the receipt of inter-vivos transfers, which constitute initial assets a,
as well as with human capital h.
The Education Decision Denoting by V (ja, s, sp; a, h) the lifetime utility of a child of age
ja with initial assets and human capital (a, h), with parents with educational attainment sp and
who chooses education level s, we obtain as post-education decision skill state
s =

no if V (ja, s = no; a, h) ≥ max{V (ja, s = hs, sp; a, h), V (ja, s = co, sp; a, h)}
hs if V (ja, s = hs; a, h, sp) ≥ max{V (ja, s = no; a, h), V (ja, s = co; sp, a, h)}
co if V (ja, s = co; a, h, sp) ≥ max{V (ja, s = no; a, h), V (ja, s = hs, sp; a, h)}.
(3)
The pre-education decision value function is then given as
V (ja, a, h, sp) = max
s∈{no,hs,co}
{V (ja, s; a, h, sp)}. (4)
In the computational implementation, we additionally apply extreme value type I (Gumbel) dis-
tributed taste shocks to smooth the decision problem.3 Accordingly, decisions for the three
education alternatives are probabilistic and governed by the choice probabilities π(ja, s, sp; a, h).
Choices During Working Life After having made the education decision s ∈ {no, hs, co},
which determines their permanent productivity in the labor market γ(s, h), children draw the
stochastic component of their labor productivity η ∼ Π(η) which then evolves according to the
Markov transition matrix π(η′|η). The state variables of the newly formed household consequently
are (j, s, η, a, h) and the continuation value functions V (j, s, η; a, h) are determined by simple
life-cycle consumption-saving problems, whose details vary by the chosen education level s.
Starting with children who have decided to drop out of high-school, s = no, a typical single
household solves the following dynamic problem during working ages j ∈ {ja, ..., jr − 1}
V (j, no, η; a, h) = max
c,a′
{
u(c)− v(`(si)) + β
∑
η′
π(η′ | η)V (j + 1, no, η′; a′, h)
}
3Given this structure, the set of individuals exactly indifferent between two education choices is of measure
zero and thus it is inconsequential how we break the indifference.
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subject to
a′ + c(1 + τ c) = a(1 + r(1− τ k)) + y(1− τ p)− T (y(1− 0.5τ p))
y = wγ(no, h)ε(no, j, si)η`(si)
a′ ≥ 0
where the per period utility function u(·) with household consumption c as its argument satisfies
standard properties. Since labor supply is exogenous, the disutility of work v (·) does not affect
optimal choices of children, but impacts the child value functions which enter the parental transfer
decision problem. In the budget constraint, recall that γ(s, h) is permanent labor productivity
which depends on acquired human capital and the chosen level of education s = no. The
function T (·) represents a progressive labor income tax code and (1 − 0.5τ p)y is taxable labor
income, where τ p is the social security contribution rate (and employer contributions to social
security are non-taxable income). Accordingly, we can write the education-specific expected value
functions V (j, no, a, h) in (3) as
V (j, no; a, h) =
∑
η
Π(η) · V (j, no, η; a, h).
Children who continue in high school but do not attend or complete college, i.e., education
group s = hs, solve the following decision problem at age j = ja
V (j, hs, sp; a, h) = max
c,a′
{u(c)− v(χ(hs)`(si))− p(s, sp, h)+
β
∑
η′
Π(η′)V (j + 1, hs, η′, a′, h)
}
subject to
a′ + c(1 + τ c) = a(1 + r(1− τ k)) + y(1− τ p)− T (y(1− 0.5τ p))
y = wγ(no, h)ε(no, j, si)χ(hs)`(si)
a′ ≥ 0.
That is, high-school students work for high-school dropout wages γ(no, h) · ε(no, j, si) during
a fraction χ(hs) of their time `(si). The term p(s, sp, h) represents a utility cost associated
with attending high school which is decreasing in the amount of human capital h previously
acquired by the student. They have to form expectation over stochastic labor market productivity
upon graduating in the subsequent period. Upon graduating, for their remaining working life-
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cycle j ∈ {jh, ..., jr − 1} these individuals solve a dynamic problem analogous to the one of
high-school dropouts described above, but with earnings process wγ(hs, h)ε(hs, j, si)η`(si).
Finally, children that decide, at age ja, to attend (and by assumption, to complete) college
have education indicator s = co, and solve, during ages {ja, ..., jh−1} the same problem as
group s = hs, with the modification that the continuation value differs at age jh−1 through the
value function V (jh, co, sp; a, h). For ages j ∈ {jh, ..., jc − 2} they solve
V (j, co, sp; a, h) = max
c,a′
{u(c)− v(χ(co)`(si))− p(co, sp, h) + βV (j + 1, co, sp; a′, h)}
subject to
a′ + c(1 + τ c) = a(1 + r(1− τ k)) + y(1− τ p)− T (y(1− 0.5τ p))− ι
y = wγ(hs, h)ε(hs, j,ma)χ(co)`(si)
a′ ≥ −a(j, co, ch).
At age j = jc−1 their continuation value (but not their budget set) changes to reflect entry into
the labor market in the subsequent period, taking expectations over the stochastic component of
productivity η′ next period.
V (j, s, sp; a, h) = max
c,a′
{u(c)− v(χ(co)`(si))− p(s, sp, h)+
β
∑
η′
Π(η′) · V (j + 1, co, η′; a′, h)
}
.
For the remaining working phase of the life-cycle j ∈ {jc, ..., jr − 1} these individuals solve a
dynamic problem analogous to the one of high-school dropouts described above, but with earnings
process wγ(co, h)ε(co, j)η`(si).
The Retirement Phase During retirement, at ages {jr, ..., J}, all three education groups
of the children generation solve a standard consumption-saving problem of the form:
V (j, s, η; a) = max
c,a′
{u (c) + βV (j + 1, s, η; a′)}
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subject to
a′ + c(1 + τ c) = a(1 + r(1− τ k)) + y − T (y)
y = pen(s, si, ηjr−1, h)
a′ ≥ −0
η = ηjr−1,
where pen(s, si, ηjr−1, h) is retirement income, whose dependence on ηjr−1, s and h serves to
proxy for the progressive nature of the social security system.
2.2.2 Parents
Given the focus of the paper, we model parental households as becoming economically active at
the beginning of age jf > ja when they give birth to children. Parents are endowed with initial
assets a, education s, an initial idiosyncratic productivity state η, and are distinguished by their
marital status m. Children live with adult households until they form their own households as
described above. Thus, for parental ages {jf , ..., jf + ja− 1} children are present in the parental
household. Parents derive utility from per capita consumption of all household members and
leisure. During the age bracket {jf , jf + ja − 1} they solve the dynamic problem
V (j, s,m, η; a, h) = max
c,im,it,a′,h′
{
u
(
c
1 + ζcξ(m, s) + 1m=maζa
)
− v
(
`(m) + κ · ξ(m, s) · it
1 + 1m=ma
)
+β
∑
η′
π(η′|η)V (j, s,m, η′; a′, h′)
}
subject to
a′ + c(1 + τ c) + ξ(m, s)im = a(1 + r(1− τ k)) + y(1− τ p)− T (y(1− 0.5τ p))
y = wε(s, j,m)η`(m)
a′ ≥ −a(j, s, k)
h′ = g(j, h, i(im, it, ig))
where h is the human capital of the number ξ(m, s) of children in the household characterized
by parental education s and marital status m. We express monetary investments im and time
investments it on a per-child basis. Notice that the sum of hours worked and weighted time
investment in children in the disutility function v(·) is divided by the number of household mem-
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bers. Parameter κ is a weight on time investments into children, and reflects the possibility that
reading to children carries a different disutility of time than answering emails at work.
At parental age jf + ja children form own adult households and this is the only period in
which parents can make inter-vivos transfers b. These transfers immediately (that is, within the
period) become assets of their children, and thus generate utility for their parents.4 The dynamic
program then reads as
V (ja + jf , s,m, η; a, h) = max
c,b,a′
{
u
(
c
1 + 1m=maζa
)
− v
(
`(m)
1 + 1m=maζa
)
+β
∑
η′
π(η′|η)V (ja + jf + 1, s,m, η′; a′) + νV
(
ja,
b
1 + r(1− τ k)
, h, s
)}
subject to
a′ + c(1 + τ c) + ξ(m, s)b = a(1 + r(1− τ k)) + y(1− τ p)− T (y(1− τ p))
y = wε(s, j,m)η`(m)
a′ ≥ 0.
After children have left the household, the parent generation solves, at age j ∈ {ja + jf +
1, ..., jr − 1}
V (j, s,m, η, a) = max
c,a′
{
u
(
c
1 + 1m=maζa
)
− v
(
`(m)
1 + 1m=maζa
)
+ β
∑
η′
π(η′|η)V (j + 1, s,m, η′, a′)
}
subject to
a′ + c(1 + τ c) = a(1 + r(1− τ k)) + y(1− τ p)− T (y(1− τ p))
y = wε(s, j,m)η`(m)
a′ ≥ 0
Finally, in retirement ages j ∈ {jr, ..., J}, all three education groups of parents solve a standard
consumption-saving problem analogous to the one of the children generation described in the
previous section.
4Note that since assets in the value function enter the budget constraint as being multiplied by the gross,
after-tax interest rate 1 + r(1− τk), and since inter-vivos transfers are received in the same period in which
they are made and thus do not accrue interest, these transfers b have to be divided by 1 + r(1− τk) in the
Bellman equation of the parent.
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2.3 Government
The government runs a PAYGO pension system with a balanced budget. It also finances ex-
ogenous government spending, expressed as a share of aggregate output G/Y , and aggregate
education subsidies through consumption taxes, capital income taxes and a progressive labor in-
come tax code. In the initial scenario without the COVID-19 shock and the ensuing recession, the
government budget clears by adjustment of the consumption tax rate. In the thought experiments
we hold all tax parameters constant, therefore implicitly assuming that the shortfalls or surpluses
generated by a change in the environment are absorbed by government debt serviced by future
generations.
2.4 Thought Experiment
We compute an initial stationary partial equilibrium with exogenous wages and returns prior to
model period t = 0. In period t = 0, the COVID-19 shock unexpectedly occurs, and from
that point on unfolds deterministically. That is, factor prices and fiscal policies are fixed, and
households get surprised once by the shock, after which they have perfect foresight with respect to
aggregate economic conditions. The COVID-19 crisis impacts the economy through two channels:
1. An education crisis: the government closes schools, represented in the model by a temporary
(6 month) reduction in public investment ig into child human capital production.
2. An aggregate income recession: a decline in parental incomes induced by an assumed decline
of hours worked and an increase in the probability of drawing a low labor productivity π(η′ =
ηl | η ∈ {ηl, ηh}), which also increases the probability weight on ηl in the stationary invariant
distribution Π(η).
We then trace out the impact of these temporary shocks on parental human capital inputs
(both time and money) and intergenerational transfer decisions, as well as on the education
choices, future labor market outcomes, and welfare of the children generation, both in terms of
its aggregates as well as in terms of its distribution. Since children differ by age at the time of the
shock (as well as in terms of parental characteristics), so will the long-run impact on educational
attainment, future wages, and welfare. We will place special emphasis on this heterogeneity.
3 Calibration
A subsect of parameters is calibrated exogenously not using the model. These first stage pa-
rameters are summarized in Table 3. The second stage parameters are those that are calibrated
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endogenously by matching moments in the data and are summarized in Table 4. We next describe
in detail our choice and sources of first stage parameters and the moments we match to calibrate
the second stage parameters.
Table 3: First Stage Calibration Parameters
Parameter Interpretation Value
Population
j = 0 Age at economic birth (age 4) 0
ja Age at beginning of econ life (age 16) 6
jh Age at finishing HS (age 18) 7
jc Age at finishing CL (age 22) 9
jf Fertility Age (age 32) 14
jr Retirement Age (age 66) 31
J Max. Lifetime (age 80) 38
ξ(m, s) Fertility rates see main text
Φ(jf ,m, s) Distribution of parents by martial status and education, age jf PSID
Preferences
θ Relative risk aversion parameter 1
ϕ Curvature of labor disutility 0.5
ζa Adult equivalence parameter 0.5 (OECD)
Labor Productivity
{ε(j, s,m)} Age Profile PSID
[ηl, ηh] States of Markov process [0.8439, 1.1561]
πhl Transition probability of Markov process 0.0324
πldhl(s) Transition probability of Markov process after lockdown [0.5078,0.4537,0.2081]
χs Hours worked for students, as a fraction of full time (HS and
CL)
{0.2, 0.5}
γ(s, h) Ability gradient of earnings Estimated on NLSY79 data
from Abbott et al. (2019)
Endowments
l(m) Average hours worked by marital status PSID
Φ(a|jf ,m, s) Asset distr-n of parents by martial status and education, age jf PSID
a(jf , s, pa) Borrowing limit for parents at age jf PSID
Ability/Human Capital and Education
ι College tuition costs (annual) 14756.43762$
a(j ∈ [jh, jc−1], co, ch) College borrowing limit 45000$
σh Elast of subst b/w human capital and CES inv. aggr. 1
σg Elast of subst b/w public inv. and CES aggr. of private inv. 2.43
σm Elast of subst b/w monetary and time inv. 1
κm3 CES share parameter of monetary and time inv. (age bin 6-8) 0.5
κgj , j > 0 Share of government input for ages 6 and older 0.676
Φ(h(j = 0)|sp, yp, ap) Innate ability dist-n of children by parental char-s PSID-CDS 2014
h(j = 0) Normalization parameter of initial dist-n of initial ability 0.1248
Government policy
ξ Public CL education subsidy 38.8%
igj Public early education spending by age ≈ 5000$ (UNESCO)
τc Consumption Tax Rate 5.0%
τk Capital Income Tax Rate 28.3%
τp Soc Sec Payroll Tax 12.4%
Notes: First stage parameters calibrated exogenously by reference to other studies and data.
3.1 Age Brackets
The model is calibrated at a biannual frequency. We initialize the parental economic life-cycle
when their children are of age 4, which is model age j = 0. The reason for this initialization
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Table 4: Second Stage Calibration Parameters
Parameter Interpretation Value
Preferences
β Time discount rate (target: asset to income ratio, age 25-60) 0.9812
ν Altruism parameter (target: average IVT transfers to total
wealth ratio)
0.7853
φ Weight on labor disutility (target: fraction of group s = hs) 0.1139
Labor Productivity
ρ0(s) Normalization parameter (target: Eγ(s, h) = 1) [0.2261, 0.0429,−0.1815]
Human Capital and Education
κ Utility weight on time inv. (target: average time inv.) 0.7216
κhj Share of human capital (target: average monetary inv. & slope
of time inv.)
cf. Figure 2
κmj Share of monetary input (target: slope of money inv.) cf. Figure 2
κg0 Share of government input for age bin 4-6 (target: average time
inv. age bin 4-6)
0.4055
Ā Investment scale parameter (target: average HK at age ja) 1.2110
ĀHS Investment scale parameter in HS (target: average HK at age
ja+1)
1.0740
%(sp = no) psychological costs (target: fraction of group s = co) -0.0001
%(sp = co) psychological costs (target: conditional fraction of group s = co) -0.3300
Government policy
λ Level parameter of HSV tax function (balance gvt budget) 0.8644
ρp Pension replacement rate (balance socsec budget) 0.1893
Notes: Second stage parameters calibrated endogenously by targeting selected data moments.
age is the calibration of the initial human capital endowment h(j = 0), which is informed by
data on test scores measures at child biological ages 3 to 5, as described below. Thus, children
are irrelevant to the economic model for the first 3 years of their biological lives. Parental age
at the economic “birth” of children is jf = 14, which we also refer to as “fertility” age. This
corresponds to a biological age of 32, when children are of biological age 4.5 Children make the
higher eduction decision at biological age 16, model age ja = 6. Children who complete high
school stay in school for one additional model period, thus high school is completed at jh = 7.
Children who attend college stay in college for two model periods, thus college is completed
at jc = 9. Retirement is at the exogenous age jr = 31, corresponding to biological age 66.
Households live at most until age J = 38.
3.2 Preferences
The per period subutility function u(x) is of the standard iso-elastic power form
u(x) =
1
1− θ
(
x1−θ − 1
)
.
5Thus, children are biologically born at parental age 28.
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In our baseline specification, we set θ = 1 (logarithmic utility), and consequently child and adult
equivalence scale parameters are irrelevant for the problem. In the parental household’s problem,
the per period subutility function v(x) is
v(x) = x1+
1
ϕ
so that if x = `, parameter ϕ can be interpreted as a Frisch elasticity of labor supply. In our
model of exogenous labor supply this interpretation of course seizes to be relevant, but it provides
us with a direct way of calibrating the power term of the utility function. We set ϕ = 0.5 based
on standard estimates of the Frisch elasticity.
When children live in the parental household, we have x = `(m)+κ·ξ(m,s)·i
t
1+1m=ma
. `(m) are hours
worked by marital status, which we estimate from the data, giving annual hours of `(si) = 1868
and `(ma) = 3810. The time cost parameter κ is calibrated to match average time investments
by parents into the education of children, giving κ = 0.72 (with further details described below
as part of the calibration of the human capital technology). The adult equivalence parameter ζa
is set to ζa = 0.5 according to standard OECD adult equivalence scales.
When children attend high school or college, they experience psychological costs for s ∈
{hs, co} according to the cost function
p(s, sp;h) = φ(1 + %(sp)1j∈[jh,jc−1]1s=co)
1
h
.
We calibrate the parameters of the cost function to match education shares in the data for the
three groups s ∈ {no, hs, co}. We measure these shares for adults older than age 18 for the PSID
waves 2011, 2013, 2015 and 2017, and assume that children have the same education shares as the
couples of the parental generation. Parameter φ is calibrated to match the fraction of children with
a high school degree and no college of 55.65%, giving φ = 0.11. The additional shifter %(sp) only
applies to children who attend college and reflects that psychological costs of college attendance
depend on parental education. We set %(sp = no) = %(sp = hs) and calibrate it to match the
fraction of children with a college degree of 28.02%, giving %(sp = no) = %(sp = hs) = −0.0001.
In light of the monetary costs of college attendance this parameter can also be interpreted as
consumption value of college attendance and, thus, can take either positive or negative values. In
turn, %(sp = co) is calibrated to match the fraction of children in college conditional on parents
having a college degree of 63.3% (cf. Krueger and Ludwig (2016)). This gives %(s = co) = −0.33
reflecting that utility benefits for children of households with a college degree are even higher.
Households discount utility at rate β. We follow Busch and Ludwig (2020) and calibrate it to
match the assets to income ratio in the PSID for ages 25 to 60 giving an annual discount factor
of β = 0.98.
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Utility of future generations is additionally discounted at rate ν. Parameter ν is chosen so
that in equilibrium total inter-vivos transfers in the economy account for 0.82% of wealth as in
the 1986 SCF. Our target is based on Gale and Scholz (1994), Table 4, as the sum of inter-vivos
transfers for college expenses and other inter-vivos transfers. This gives ν = 0.79.
3.3 Initial Distribution of Parents
3.3.1 Marital Status
We measure marital status by the legal status from the PSID years 2013 to 2017 in the sample
of parents. This gives a share of singles of 51.7% and a share of married households of 48.3%.
3.3.2 Education Categories
We group the data by years of education. Less than high school, s = no, is for less than 12 years
of formal education. High school completion (but no college) is for more than 12 but less than 16
years of education. College is at least 16 years of education. The population shares of parents in
the three education categories by their marital status are summarized in Table 5.6 In the initial
steady state pre shock solution of the model we calibrate the model so that the education shares
of children are equal to those of the parental generation.
Table 5: Fraction of Households by Education for each Marital Status
Education s/Marital Status m si ma
no 0.2194 0.1621
hs 0.6064 0.5577
co 0.1742 0.2802
Notes: Fraction with education s ∈ {no, hs, co} by marital status.
3.3.3 Demographics
The number of children by marital status and education of parents ξ(m, s) computed as the
average number of children living in households with household heads aged 25-35 is summarized
in Table 6.
6The educational distribution is consistent with many other studies based on the PSID, cf., e.g., Heathcote
et al. (2010).
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Table 6: Number of Children by Marital Status and Education
Education s/Marital Status m si ma
no 2.36 2.33
hs 1.86 2.15
co 1.77 1.96
Notes: Number of children by marital status and education.
3.3.4 Assets
Conditional on the initial distribution of parents by marital status and education, we measure as
averages of biological ages 25-35 the distribution of assets according to asset quintiles, which gives
the initial distribution Φ(a | jf ,m, s). We set the borrowing constraint of parents according to
asset holdings in the lowest quintile of the asset distribution giving a(jf , s, pa). For all ages j > jf
we let
a(j, s, pa) = a(j − 1, s, pa)(1 + r)− rp
and compute rp such that the terminal condition a(jr, s, pa) = 0 is met.
3.3.5 Income
We draw initial income shocks assuming independence of the asset position according to the
stationary invariant distribution of the 2-state Makov process, thus Π(ηh) = 0.5.
3.4 Productivity
We use PSID data to regress log wages measured at the household level on a cubic in age of the
household head, time dummies, family size, a dummy for marital status, and person fixed effects.
Predicting the age polynomial (and shifting it by marital status) gives our estimates of ε(m, s, j).
We next compute log residuals and estimate moments of the earnings process by GMM and pool
thos across education categories and marital status.7 We assume a standard process of the log
residuals according to a permanent and transitory shock specification, i.e., we decompose log
residual wages yt as
yt = zt + εt
zt = ρzt−1 + νt
7We thank Zhao Jin for sharing her code with us.
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and estimate this process pooled across education and marital status. To approximate the process
in our model, we first translate it into an AR(1) process as
yt = ρyt−1 + νt + εt − ρεt−1
with variance of the total error term σ2ν + (1− ρ)2σ2ε , and then approximate the resulting process
as a 2-state Markov process. The estimates are reported in Table 7.
Table 7: Stochastic Wage Process
Estimates Markov Chain
Parameter ρ σ2ν σ
2
ε σ
2
ν + (1− ρ)2σ2ε σ2y πhh = πll [ηl, ηh]
Estimate 0.9559 0.0168 0.0566 0.0217 0.2516 0.9676 [0.8439, 1.1561]
Notes: Estimated moments of residual log wage process.
We set the fraction of time working during high school to χ(hs) = 0.2, which can be
interpreted as a maximum time of work of one day of a regular work week. In college, students
may work for longer hours and we accordingly set χ(co) = 0.5.
The mapping of acquired human capital into earnings according to γ(s, h) is based on Abbott
et al. (2019). We use their data—the NLSY79, which includes both wages and test scores of the
Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT)—to measure residual wages ω(s) of education group s
(after controlling for an education specific age polynomial) and run the regression
ln (ω(s)) = ρ1(s) · ln
(e
ē
)
+ ε(s),
where ε(s) is an education group specific error term and ē are average test scores. We denote
the education group specific coefficient estimate by ρ̂1(s), see Table 8. The estimated ability
gradient is increasing in education reflecting complementarity between ability and education. In
the model, we correspondingly let
ln (γ(s, h)) = ρ0(s) + ρ̂1(s) · ln
(
h
h̄
)
,
where h̄ is average acquired human capital at j = ja (biological age 16) and ρ0(s) is an education
group s specific normalization parameter, chosen such that∫
exp
(
ρ0(s) + ρ̂1(s) · ln
(
h
h̄
))
Φ(dh, s) = 1.
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The normalization—which gives ρ0(s) = 0.23, 0.04,−0.18, for s ∈ {no, hs, co}, respectively—
implies that the average education premia are all reflected in ε(s, j,ma), which in turn are directly
estimated on PSID data.
Table 8: Ability Gradient by Education Level
Education Level Ability Gradient
HS- 0.351 (0.0407)
(HS & CL-) 0.564 (0.0233)
(CL & CL+) 0.793 (0.0731)
Notes: Estimated ability gradient ρ̂1(s), using NLSY79 as provided in replication files for Abbott et al.
(2019). Standard errors in parentheses.
3.5 Human Capital Production Function
At birth at age j = 0, children draw their innate ability (initial human capital) h = h0 conditional
on the distribution of parents by parental characteristics sp,mp, thus h0 ∼ Ψ(h(j = 0) | sp,mp).
We calibrate the distribution from the test score distribution in the PSID Child Development
Supplement (CDS) survey I-III, and match it to parental characteristics by merging the survey
waves with the PSID. We consider children for whom both caregivers correspond to the household
head and spouse in a PSID household8, and for whom at least one of the caregivers is the
biological parent. This leaves us with 4393 observations (2419 children) for the three waves of
the survey. Table 9 reports the joint distribution of average test scores of the children by parental
education and marital status. We use this test score distribution as a proxy for the initial human
capital distribution of children conditional on parental education and marital status.9 We base
the calibration of the initial ability distribution of children on this data by drawing six different
types of children depending on the combination of marital status (2) and parental education (3).
Children’s initial human capital is normalized as the test score of that mp, sp-group relative to the
average test score. We further scale the resulting number by the calibration parameter h̄0 and,
thus, initial human capital of the children is a multiple of h̄0. The calibration of h̄0 is described
next as part of the calibration of the overall human capital technology. Initial abilities relative to
average abilities and the corresponding multiples of h̄0 for the six types are contained in Table 9.
At ages j0, . . . , ja − 1 children receive parents’ education investments through money and
time im(j), it(j) and governmental time investments ig, respectively. Education investments of
8In case of singles, only the household head is the primary caregiver.
9Importantly, by correlating the test score distribution with these parental characteristics, we do not
pose a causal link between parental education and children’s characteristics. The test scores just give us a
convenient way to proxy the initial joint distribution.
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Table 9: Initial Ability by Parental Education
Marital Status and Educ of HH Head Avg. Score Fraction of h̄0
Single Low 35 0.843
Single Medium 38 0.906
Single High 46 1.107
Married Low 39 0.945
Married Medium 41 0.984
Married High 45 1.085
Notes: Estimated initial ability of children as measured by the letter word test in the Child Development
Supplement Surveys 1-3 (years 1997, 2002, 2007) of the PSID.
the government are certain, known by parents, and equal across children. Human capital is
acquired given a multi-layer human capital production function
h′(j) =
(
κhjh
1− 1
σh + (1− κhj )i(j)
1− 1
σh
) 1
1− 1
σh (5a)
i(j) = Ā
(
κgj
(
ig
īg
)1− 1
σg
+ (1− κgj )
(
ip(j)
īp
)1− 1
σg
) 1
1− 1
σg
(5b)
ip(j) =
(
κmj
(
im(j)
īm,d
)1− 1
σm
+ (1− κmj )
(
it(j)
īt,d
)1− 1
σm
) 1
1− 1
σm
, (5c)
which partially features age dependent parameters for calibration purposes. We also divide the ex-
ogenous investments by the government ig and the endogenous age dependent per child monetary
and time investments by the parents im(j), it(j), as well as the CES aggregate of these (normal-
ized) investments, ip(j), by their respective unconditional means through which we achieve unit
independence.
The outermost nest (first nest) augments human capital and total investments according to
a CES aggregate with age-specific parameter κhj and age-independent σ
h. We set σh = 1 and
calibrate κhj to match (per child) time investments by age of the child. We model age dependency
as
ln
(
1− κhj
κhj
)
= ακ
h
0 + α
κh
1 · j + ακ
h
1 · j2 (6)
and determine ακ
h
1 , α
κh
2 by an indirect inference approach such that the age pattern of log per
child time investments in the data equals the pattern in the model for biological ages 6 to 14
of the child. Recall that we in turn match the average level of time investments at biological
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ages 6 to 14 by calibrating the utility cost parameter κ. Time investments at biological age 4 are
matched differently with details described below. The intercept term ακ
h
0 is calibrated to match
average monetary investments. Panel (a) of Figure 2 displays the resulting age profile. Consistent
with Cunha et al. (2010), we find that the weight on acquired human capital at age j is increasing
in j, so that investments become less important in the course of the life-cycle. While our model
is not directly comparable to their empirical analysis,10 also the magnitude of κhj is similar.
Figure 2: Age Dependent Parameters κhj , κ
m
j over Child Age
4 6 8 10 12 14
0.78
0.8
0.82
0.84
0.86
0.88
0.9
0.92
(a) Weight κhj
4 6 8 10 12 14
0.45
0.5
0.55
0.6
(b) Weight κmj
Notes: Age-specific weight parameters κhj and κ
m
j calibrated endogenously to match time and money invest-
ment profiles.
In the second nest, division of time investments by the government through its mean im-
plies that in the initial equilibrium i
g
īg
= 1. We restrict κgj = κ̄
g for j > 0 and calibrate it
exogenously according to the estimates for the US by Kotera and Seshadri (2017)—who esti-
mate the parameters of a CES nesting of private and public education investments similar to
ours—giving κ̄g = 0.676.
At biological age 4 of the child, children are still in kindergarten. To take into account this
structural break in the process of education according to the institutional setting, we separately
calibrate κg0 to match the average time investments by parents into their children at biological
age 4 of the child. This gives κg0 = 0.41.
The calibration of the substitution elasticity σg is again by reference to Kotera and Seshadri
(2017) who estimate an elasticity of substitution between private and government investment
of σg = 2.43. Thus, parental and government investments are gross substitutes but substitution
across these education inputs is far from perfect.
10Total Investments in our model in the first nest include government investments from the second nest,
and we do not distinguish explicitly between cognitive and non-cognitive skills.
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Ā is a computational normalization parameter which we choose such that average acquired
human capital is equal to 1, sufficiently below the maximum human capital gridpoint, giving Ā =
1.21. Parameter h̄0—which we introduced above as part of our discussion of the initial ability
distribution in Table 9—is calibrated such that the ratio of average human capital at j = 5
(biological age 14) to j = 0 (biological age 4) is equal to the ratio of test scores for age
groups 14-15 to age group 3-5, which gives h̄0 = 0.12.
The third nest augments the endogenous age specific per child monetary and time investments.
As in Lee and Seshadri (2019) we restrict σm = 1. The age dependency of κmj is specified as
ln
(
1− κmj
κmj
)
= ακ
m
0 + α
κm
1 · j
We calibrate ακ
m
0 to achieve the normalization κ
m
2 = 0.5, and α
κm
1 is calibrated to match the
monetary investment profile, which is relatively flat in the data. The resulting age profile of κmj
is displayed in Panel (b) of Figure 2.
At age ja the human capital process is extended to the high school period (i.e., for all children
with education s = hs and s = co). Time and monetary investments by parents in this phase of
the life-cycle are zero because children have already left the parental household and the human
capital production function at j = ja, s ∈ {hs, co} is
h′(j) = Ã
(
κh6h
1− 1
σh + (1− κh6)
(
ig
īg
)1− 1
σh
) 1
1− 1
σh
. (7)
We compute κh6 as a predicted value from the above described regression in (6) and calibrate the
additional scaling parameter Ã such that the ratio of average human capital at j = 6 (biological
age 16) to average human capital at age j = 5 is equal to the ratio of test scores of ages 16−17
to age 14− 15 of 1.05. This gives Ã = 1.07.
The production function in (7) is an approximation as it ignores parental inputs entirely,11
reflecting that parental inputs may not be that effective at that age. The specification also
ignores that children may invest into the human capital formation themselves, which may be of
particular relevance for our main experiment of school closures. We thus regard our model of
biological age 16 children as a crude approximation and will accordingly not put a key emphasis
on those children when discussing our results. However, it is important for parental decisions at
younger child ages that parents do foresee that the human capital process for age 16 children
11It would not be possible in our setup to model parental inputs at that age because children have already
left the household.
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continues when children have left the household, which is our main motivation for extending the
human capital accumulation process beyond that age.
3.6 College Tuition Costs & Borrowing Constraint of Children
We base the calibration of college tuition costs and borrowing constraints for college youngsters
on Krueger and Ludwig (2016). The net price (tuition, fees, room and board net of grants and
education subsidies) for one year of college in constant 2005 dollars is 13,213$. In 2008 dollars,
the maximum amount of publicly provided students loans per year is given by 11, 250$. which is
the borrowing limit in the model for s = co and j ∈ [jh, jc − 1]. For all ages j ≥ jc we let
a(j, co, ch) = a(j − 1, co, ch)(1 + r)− rp
and compute rp such that the terminal condition a(jr, co, ch) = 0 is met.
3.7 Government
The government side features the budget of the general tax and transfer system and a separate
budget of the pension system. In the general budget the revenue side is represented by con-
sumption, capital income and labor income taxes. The respective values for the first two are as
follows: τc = 0.05 and τk = 0.2. The labor income tax code is approximated by the following
two-parameter function, as in, e.g., Benabou (2002) and Heathcote et al. (2017):
T (y) = y − λy1−τ ,
where τ is the progressivity parameter and λ determines the average tax rate. We set τ = 0.18
as suggested by estimates of Heathcote et al. (2017) and calibrate λ endogenously to close the
government budget, giving λ = 0.86.
The expenditure side of the government budget (beyond the transfers implied by the tax
function above) is given by the government spending on children of school age and the college
subsidy for college students. The former we approximate as 5000$ per pupil based on UNESCO
(1999-2005) data, as for example in Holter (2015). The latter is set to 0.388 of tuition costs, as
in Krueger and Ludwig (2016).
As for the pension system, the payroll tax τ p is set to the current legislative level of 12.4% and
the pension benefit level relating average pension benefits to average net wages is endogenously
chosen such that the budget of the pension system is balanced giving a replacement benefit level
of ρp = 0.18.
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3.8 Calibrating the Pandemic Induced Recession
The calibration of the average income loss for parental households during the lockdown is based
on the aggregate output drop in the US in the first and second quarter of 2020 of 4.8% and 32.9%
with respect to the previous year, respectively. Assuming, as an optimistic baseline calibration,
full recovery in the third quarter this implies a reduction of output in our two year model by (0.5 ·
(4.8 + 32.9)/4)% = 4.7%. According to Bick and Blandin (2020) the drop of hours relative to
February 2020 during the six months March to August was 17.3%, which in our two year model
under the optimistic scenario of full recovery in the third quarter translates into a reduction of
aggregate hours by 17.3/4% = 4.3%. Accordingly 4.3/4.7 · 100% = 92% of the aggregate
income reduction is due to the drop in hours and the 8% is due to a drop in productivity. This
productivity reduction is calibrated by assuming a one-time increase of the probability of transiting
from high to low incomes in our two stage approximation of the Markov process, πhl. In turn,
the hours drop is calibrated by reducing hours worked of those households who have low labor
productivity, η = ηl, during the recession.
To also take into account the heterogenous distribution of this reduction of hours and produc-
tivity across education groups we resort to Mahnken (2020), who reports that the unemployment
rate of workers with education of less than high school (s = no) increased by 14.4 percentage
points, for workers with a high school degree but less than college (s = hs) it increased by 12.9
percentage points, and for workers with a college degree (s = co) only by 5.9 percentage points.12
We approximate this in our income shock calibration in terms of relative losses of hours and pro-
ductivity by factor 14.4/5.9 = 2.44 for education group s = no and by factor 12.9/5.9 = 2.18 for
education group s = hs. To account for this heterogeneity across education groups we specify
the transition probabilities of the Markow process in the period of the lockdown as education
specific and calibrate πldhl(s) = π
ld(η′ = ηl | η = ηh, s) to match the share of 8% of the aggregate
income decline and its distribution. We accordingly let
πldhl(s = no) = 2.44 · πldhl(s = co)
πldhl(s = hs) = 2.18 · πldhl(s = co)
and calibrate πldhl(s = co) to match the average income reduction by 4.7% taking as given the
aggregate hours reduction (and its distribution) by 4.3% . This gives πldhl(s = co) = 0.0308, thus
implying πldhl(s = hs) = 0.0671 and π
ld
hl(s = no) = 0.0751. Likewise, we distribute the aggregate
hours reduction of 4.3% across the education groups who experience low productivity, η = ηl,
12See the figure entitled “Unemployment Rate by Educational Attainment (seasonally adjusted)” from
which one can read off these exact numbers.
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in the period of the recession which gives a an average reduction within education categories
by 5.40%, 4.83% and 2.21% for s = no, s = hs and s = co, respectively.
3.9 Evaluating the Model
Figure 3 shows average time and monetary investments in the model and the data by the age
of the child. The good match of the model of time investments in Panel (b) is a consequence
of calibration since this is largely a targeted profile through age dependent parameter κhj and
parameter κg0. Monetary investments in Panel (a) are slightly downward sloping in the data, and
we match the lower slope of monetary investments compared to time investments through the
age dependency of κmj .
Figure 4 shows the analogous output by parental education levels, all of which are not targeted
in the calibration. The model matches well the positive slope of both types of investment in
parental education.
Figure 3: Money and Time Investments by Age of Child
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Notes: Average money and time investments by children’s biological age in the data (black circles) and
model (blue crosses).
In our calibration we also do not target directly measures of inter-generational persistence. We
measure inter-generational persistence of education by the regression coefficient β1 in a regression
of parental education on children’t education,
sp = β0 + β1s. (8)
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Figure 4: Money and Time Investments by Education of Parents
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Notes: Average money and time investments by parent’s education in the data (black circles) and model
(blue crosses). LHS: less than high school (s = no), HS: high school (s = hs), CL: college (s = co).
In this regression we form two groups, non-college for s ∈ {no, hs} and sp ∈ {no, hs} and
college, for s = co, respectively sp = co. Standard estimates of inter-generational education
persistence according to this metric range from 0.4 to 0.5 and our (non-targeted) coefficient
estimate of β1 = 0.41 is in that range. Likewise, we measure inter-generational persistence of
earnings. To this purpose we follow parents and their children over the life-cycle until the age
before retirement at j = jr − 1. We then perform a regression analogous to (8) based on log
earnings. The resulting coefficient of inter-generational earnings persistence is 0.33, close to the
standard estimate of 0.4 (Restuccia and Urrutia (2004)).
Our model implies a significant decline of incomes of children from the closure of schools.
We are not aware of any empirical evidence on the effects of school closures on later in live
outcomes for children in the US and therefore resort to the reduced form evidence of Jaume and
Willén (2019) on the effects of teacher strikes in Argentina between 1983 and 2014 on long-run
economic outcomes of the affected children. Their main estimates refer to the closing of primary
schools by half a year, and they report that this leads to a reduction of wages at ages 30-40 by
about 2 − 3%. In our model, we consider for our main experiment an exogenous reduction of
investments by the government corresponding to a school closure by half a year. We can therefore
directly compare the implied average wage loss at biological ages 30−40 for children who were of
biological age 6 in the period of the lockdown predicted in our model to the estimates by Jaume
and Willén (2019). Our model predicts an income reduction by 1% for these children, which is
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around half the size of the estimates by Jaume and Willén (2019) (for a different country in a
different time period).
Finally, our calibration implies that the time investment response of parents in our full
experiment—where government education investments ig are reduced and where parental house-
holds are both subject to a negative productivity shock and a negative hours shock calibrated
as described above—translates to 2.04 hours per day of increased time investments into children
during the period of the lockdown of schools. This coincides with the estimates provided on the
basis of real time surveys by Adams-Prassl et al. (2020).
4 Aggregate Consequences of the School Closures and
Income Recession
We conduct two main thought experiments. First, we study the impact of school closures that
last for half a year, which in our two year model periods corresponds to a reduction of government
time investments ig by 25%. Second, in addition we subject parents to the asymmetric negative
income shocks described in Section 3. Recall that this income shock is mainly driven by a
reduction of hours worked and only to smaller extent by a decline of average labor productivity,
and both reductions are more severe for parents with lower educational attainment. Table 10
summarizes the average consequences of our main experiments for human capital accumulation,
educational attainment, earnings and welfare of children, and Table 11 displays the behavioral
responses of parental time- and monetary investments as well as inter-vivos transfers to these
shocks.
4.1 School Closures
4.1.1 Human Capital Accumulation, Educational Attainment and Earnings
The lockdown of schools leads to a decline in educational attainment when the children affected
by the Covid crisis today make their tertiary education decisions at age 16. As the first panel of
Table 10 (second column) shows, across all age cohorts the share of children that will end up
dropping out of high school (i.e. choosing s = no) increases by 0.66 percentage points, and the
share of college-educated children declines by −0.49 percentage points. While these shifts do not
appear to be dramatic, they correspond to a 4.1% increase in the share of children without high
school degrees, and a −1.7% decrease in the share of college educated children.
The reason for the reallocation towards lower final educational attainment is the reduction in
the amount of human capital the average child arrives with at age 16, which falls by −1.46%.
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Table 10: Aggregate Outcomes for Main Experiments
baseline Change for Children of Biological Age
average 4 6 8 10 12 14
Panel A: Lockdowns of Schools
change in %p
share s = no 16.28 0.66 0.32 1.02 0.85 0.71 0.59 0.48
share s = hs 55.54 -0.17 -0.08 -0.33 -0.24 -0.17 -0.11 -0.08
share s = co 28.18 -0.49 -0.24 -0.69 -0.62 -0.54 -0.47 -0.40
change in %
av HK 1.00 -1.46 -0.72 -1.97 -1.78 -1.61 -1.43 -1.25
av earn 0.70 -0.96 -0.48 -1.31 -1.18 -1.06 -0.93 -0.81
CEV [in %] - -0.65 -0.34 -0.88 -0.79 -0.71 -0.63 -0.54
Panel B: Lockdowns of Schools & Asymmetric Income Shock
change in %p
share s = no 16.28 0.62 0.32 0.97 0.80 0.65 0.53 0.42
share s = hs 55.54 0.14 0.19 -0.05 0.08 0.16 0.22 0.25
share s = co 28.18 -0.76 -0.51 -0.91 -0.88 -0.81 -0.74 -0.67
change in %
av HK 1.00 -1.46 -0.82 -1.98 -1.78 -1.59 -1.40 -1.21
av earn 0.70 -1.03 -0.62 -1.37 -1.25 -1.12 -0.98 -0.86
CEV [in %] - -0.75 -0.48 -1.00 -0.89 -0.80 -0.71 -0.62
Notes: share s ∈ {no, hs, co}: education share in respective education category s = no: less than high
school, s = hs: high school, s = co: college; av HK: average acquired human capital at age 16; av earn:
average life-time earnings; CEV: consumption equivalent variation. Columns for biological ages 4-14 show
the respective percentage point changes of education shares, the percent changes of acquired human capital
and average earnings, and the CEV expressed as a percent change, for children of the respective age at
the time of the school closures. Column “average” gives the respective average response. The CEV is the
consumption equivalent variation of the welfare measure (9).
As Table 11, panel A, first column, demonstrates, parents increase their private investments into
children, both in terms of resources as well as in terms of time. However, as discussed in greater
detail below, this reaction is not sufficient to fully compensate the loss of government inputs into
human capital production in the form of schooling. Consequently, average human capital at age
16 is lower than without the Covid19 school closure shock, and the child cohorts affected by the
shock choose on average lower educational attainment, which in turn implies losses in average
life-time earnings by −0.96%, see the 5th row of Table 10. Thus, a very transitory shock of closing
schools by half a year alone on average leads to a permanent reduction in long-term earnings by
almost 1% for the affected children, even after taking parental adjustments into account.
The remaining columns of Table 10 show that there is considerable heterogeneity in the size
of these effects by the age of the child at the time the schooling shock hits. Overall, the most
31
Table 11: Parental Decisions for Main Experiments
baseline %-Change for Children of Biological Age
average 4 6 8 10 12 14
Panel A: Lockdowns of Schools
av mon inv 0.09 5.23 1.69 1.60 2.50 3.94 6.69 14.93
av time inv 0.63 3.01 0.88 0.93 1.42 2.24 3.84 8.76
av ivt 1.84 0.29 0.10 0.71 0.46 0.27 0.14 0.04
Panel B: Lockdowns of Schools & Asymmetric Income Shock
av mon inv 0.09 4.99 1.05 1.24 2.17 3.69 6.57 15.21
av time inv 0.63 4.29 1.01 1.35 2.02 3.20 5.52 12.64
av ivt 1.84 -0.72 -0.88 -0.50 -0.53 -0.70 -0.81 -0.88
Notes: Columns for biological ages 4-14 show the percent changes of money investments, time investments,
and inter-vivos transfers for children of the respective age at the time of the school closures. For money and
time investments, these are averages of the percent changes of the respective investment over the remaining
life-cycle, so, e.g., for a child of age 6 the percent change is the average of the percent changes of investments
at ages 6-14 for this child. Column “average” is the raw average across the biological ages of children.
severely affected group are the 6 year old children, i.e., those at the start of primary school. For
them, the predicted share of high school dropouts increases by 1 percentage point, the share of
college educated decreases by −0.7 percentage points, and their average long-term earnings drop
by −1.3%. Younger children are most affected by the school closures due to the self-productivity
and the dynamic complementarity implied by the human capital production function: a decrease
in human capital accumulation at younger ages due to the school closures translates into lower
human capital and lower optimal investment in human capital in the future, as we will discuss
in greater detail below.13 Even though the adverse effect of school closures on human capital
accumulation and future educational attainment is most severe for young school children, it is
non-negligible even for the 14-year olds at the time of the Covid crisis. For this age cohort, the
predicted share of high school dropouts increases by 0.48 percentage points, the share of college
educated decreases by −0.4 percentage points, and their average earnings during the rest of their
life fall by −0.81%, see the last column of panel A in Table 10. Note that 4 year old children are
somewhat shielded against the negative effect of experiencing closures of day care centers and
kindergarten, due to the lower importance of governmental inputs relative to parental inputs in
the human capital production function at that age, i.e., κg0 < κ̄
g.
13Note that children aged 4 are somewhat shielded against the negative effect of experiencing closures of
day care centers and kindergarten, due to the lower importance of governmental inputs relative to parental
inputs in the human capital production function at that age. Since private investment is especially productive
at this age (see the value of κg0 versus κ
g
1 in Section 3.5), relative to age 6 where publich schooling is more
important in human capital accumulation, parents respond more strongly
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4.1.2 Parental Responses to the School Closures
The previous section painted a fairly dire picture of the long-run outcomes of children impacted by
Covid-19-induced school closures. We now document that these effects emerge despite substantial
efforts of parents to take mitigating actions. In our model, parents have three principal means by
which they can cushion the blow of the Covid-19-induced schooling crisis. They can expand their
time investments and their resource investments into the children’s human capital accumulation
during the schooling ages, and they can facilitate attending high school and college by providing
children with inter-vivos transfers. Table 11, Panel A, shows that they do all three. Specifically,
the table reports the average percentage change of parental decisions for a child of a given age j.
For a given age column j ∈ {4, 6, ..., 14} the table entry gives the percent change of investments,
averaged over the periods the child remains in the household, relative to the pre-Covid19 scenario.
For example, for children aged 4 during the crisis, the table entry measures the average change
in parental investments from age 4 to 14, while for children aged 14 during the school closure,
it captures the change in parental investments only at this age (since it is the last age the child
spends in the household). The first column displays the unweighted average, across all children
ages, of the age-specific percent changes.
On average, parents increase their monetary investments into their children’s education by
5.2%, their time investment by 3%, and their inter-vivo transfers to children by 0.3%. Thus,
overall, parents respond to the school closures with positive and substantial additional investments
into their children in all three dimensions, albeit significantly stronger with their direct human
capital investments than with their transfers once the children are about to leave the household.
As the remaining columns of the table demonstrate, the exact composition of the parental
adjustment depends on the age of the child. Parents increase their monetary investments more
for the 4 year old children than for the 6 year old, but their time investment slightly less. Note,
though, that for the 4 year old children, these are averages over the ages 4 to 14, but for the 6 year
old children only over the ages 6 to 14, so that in sum the investment into 4 year old children
are higher. The reason for this is that parental investments into human capital are especially
productive during kindergarten age.
Average monetary and time parental investments increase the least for 6 year old children, and
then increase in the age of the child.14 For none of the children ages, parents find it optimal to
completely offset the effect of the public school closure on human capital investment during the
period of the crisis. Consequently, all children leave the crisis period with less human capital than
they otherwise would have had. This reduction, due to the dynamic complementarities of human
14Note that these are average investments over the remaining childhood, and the investment horizon is
therefore longer for a young than for an old child, and a lower average increase need not mean a lower total
increase in investment over the remaining stay of the child in the household.
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capital and investment, curbs the incentives for private parental human capital investments in
all future periods. This effect is the more severe, the longer the human capital accumulation
phase during school ages still is, that is, it impacts young children the most. Furthermore, even
in the crisis period itself, monetary and time investments increase strongest for older children
in percentage terms. For time investments, part of this comes from the fact that baseline
time investment is highest for the youngest children. An additional reason lies in the decreasing
importance of public investment relative to own human capital in the human capital accumulation
process over the child life-cycle: this necessitates stronger investment responses by parents of
older children to counteract the negative effects of the school closures. Last, parents of young
children have on average lower incomes and assets than parents of older children, making it
more likely that they are borrowing constrained. Thus, for them it is relatively easier to increase
inter-vivos transfers, which are paid in the future, than current monetary investments into their
children.
In contrast to parental monetary and time investments, inter-vivos transfers increase strongest
for the 6 year old children, and then less for older children. At the end, parents care about the
lifetime utility of their offspring, and not about the means by which they buffer welfare of the
children against the adverse schooling shock. Given the dynamic complementarity mechanism ex-
plained above, it is relatively more efficient to support younger children more significantly through
higher inter-vivos transfers, whereas for older school-aged children, human capital investments
are the better option to smooth the Covid schooling shock for their children. Note, though, that
even for the parents of 6 year old children, inter-vivos transfers increase by less in relative terms
than monetary investments.
We display these dynamic adjustments of time- and monetary investments into human capital
investments of children that are six years old at the time of the school closures in Figure 5.
Panels (a) and (b) depict time- and monetary investments of parents of these children over their
life cycle, both in the benchmark no-crisis scenario and in the presence of the school closures.
Panel (c) of the same figure shows the resulting evolution of human capital as the child progresses
through school ages following the Covid shock, and Panel (d), for better visualization, displays
the absolute change of the human capital stock over the life cycle resulting from the Covid
shock. In the period of the lockdown, at biological age 6, there is a substantial increase in
parental investment. Private resource investments rise by 11% and time investment by 6%. This
is not enough, however, to compensate for the 25% decline in government inputs during this
two-year period (half a year of lost schooling), and thus at biological age 8 human capital is at a
slightly lower level than in the no-Covid scenario.15 In response, future human capital investment
15Note that panels (c) and (d) show human capital at the beginning of the period. Thus, the effect of the
Covid-19 shock at age 6 on human capital only shows up at age 8.
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Figure 5: Money and Time Investments and Human Capital over Remaining Child Life-Cycle
for Children of Age 6
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Notes: Average investments for children of age 6 over their (remaining) life-cycle and acquired human
capital at respective age. Black circles: baseline steady state, blue crosses: experiment. Panel (a): money
investments, panel (b): time investments, panel (c): acquired human capital, panel (d): absolute change of
acquired human capital. Since these are averages for children of age 6 in the period of the lockdown the
initial points at age 4 for investments and at ages 4 and 6 for acquired human capital are identical in the
baseline and in the experiment.
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incentives are dampened (due to the dynamic complementarity feature of the human capital
production function), both time- and especially resource investments are lower in subsequent
periods (at older ages of the child), with the consequence that the child 10 years after the crisis
(at age 16) enters the tertiary education phase with less human capital, therefore opting (on
average) for lower educational attainment and the associated reduction in lifetime earnings.
4.1.3 The Welfare Cost of School Closures on Children
Thus far, we have documented that the Covid-induced temporary schooling crisis triggered a re-
duction in human capital accumulation and educational attainment when currently young cohorts
of students enter high-school and college ages. Although the allocational consequences are of
course interesting in their own right, they beg the question how significant the Covid shock is
from a welfare perspective.
To answer this question we define as social welfare Wj of children that were of age j at the
time of the crisis as expected lifetime utility these children obtain when the education decisions
of all members of this group have been made and they have entered the labor market at age jc,
Wj =
∫
V (jc, s, η; a, h)Φ(jc, ds, dη; da, dh | j), (9)
where V (jc; s, η; a, h) is the value function of children at age jc after all education decisions
are made (and children with education s = co have completed college) and Φ(jc, s, η; a, h | j)
is the distribution of children at age jc over the relevant state variables: education s, income
realization η, assets a and human capital h. The distribution across these states at age jc is
conditional on age j; it is the cross-sectional distribution across young adults implied by the
distribution of this cohort at age j just prior to the lockdown, and parental and child education
decisions since then. In our household model with constant prices and constant government policy
parameters, the value function of the children V (jc; ·) upon future, post-Covid labor market entry
is not affected by the shock (which, at the time of labor market entry at age jc > j, lies in the
past for all cohorts under consideration), the welfare consequences of Covid school closures are
therefore exclusively driven by changes in the distribution Φ(·). The Covid schooling shock as
well as the ensuing parental education investments and child tertiary education choices lead to
a different (and typically worse) cross-sectional distribution of a given cohort j at labor market
entry at age jc, relative to the no-Covid scenario.
There are three dimensions along which the cross-sectional distribution for a given cohort
deteriorates due to the Covid schooling shock. First, children reach a different human capital
position h at age jc; second, they receive different amounts of inter-vivos transfers from their
parents and thus start their working lives with different assets, and third, they make different
36
tertiary education decisions and thus start working life at age jc with a different education
distribution.
To quantify the welfare consequences of the school lockdowns we compute, for each child
cohort j, the consumption equivalent variation (CEV) of the Covid19 schooling shock. That is,
we calculate the uniform percentage increase in consumption such that the average labor market
entrant of a cohort of age j is indifferent between the welfare consequences arising from the
original cross-sectional distribution across states at labor market entry and its Covid-impacted
counterpart. As the last row of Panel A in Table 11 shows, the welfare losses from the closing of
schools are quite substantial, with a reduction of welfare as measured by the CEV by −0.65% on
average. Thus, the highly temporary half-year lockdown of schools has strong long-run welfare
consequences for children in the order of −0.65% worth of permanent consumption, and this
despite the increased human capital investments by parents through home schooling and increased
resource investments. For the least affected cohorts, children aged 4 at the time of school
closures, the welfare losses are still −0.34%, and for the most affected cohort, children of age 6,
welfare losses amount to almost −0.9%. We view these as substantial welfare losses, considering
that the school closures are purely temporary shocks, and parents adjust their behavior optimally
to counteract the adverse effects on their offspring.
4.2 School Closures and Income Recession
We now turn to the thought experiment in which school closures are accompanied by adverse
income shocks stemming from the economic recession induced by the Covid-19 pandemic (or
the economic policy response to it). The reduction of incomes is primarily attributed to lower
average hours worked ( 92% of the total income decline) and, to a lesser degree, to lower labor
productivity (accounting for 8% of the income decline). Thus, the pandemic-induced economic
shock not only implies lower incomes, but at the same time leads to an increase in available
time that can be used for investment into the children’s human capital. As a consequence, as
Panel B of Table 11 shows, parents shift their school closure responses away from increased
private resource investments to higher private time investments into their children, relative to a
world where the recession income shock is absent. The time investment response now amounts
to 2.04 additional hours per day instead of 1.4 hours. The income shock induced by the recession
also leads to a decline in inter-vivos transfers, rather than the increase observed in the pure school
closure experiment.
As a consequence of the reduced parental investments, the long-term outcomes of the children
further worsen, as Panel B of Table 10 displays. The share of college-educated children drops by
−0.76 percentage points, rather than by −0.49 percentage points in the presence of only school
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closures, and long-term earnings drop by −1.03% rather than by −0.96%. The resulting adverse
welfare effects are also somewhat larger than in the case of school closures alone. While the
income loss of parental households in the Covid19 induced recession leads to additional welfare
losses for children, the direct effect of the lockdown of schools with a welfare reduction of −0.65%
is more significant for children than the additional effect of the recession, which increases the
welfare loss to −0.75%. Importantly, it turns out that there are no sizeable interactions of the
two experiments.16 Even if we model the income shock purely as a shock to resources and not
affecting parental time endowments, we still find that the utility loss from school closures alone
amounts to around 1/2 of the total welfare losses of the children. For the welfare of children,
school closures during the pandemic thus matter more than the negative income shocks to their
parents.
4.3 Children of Age 16
In the model, parental investments into children’s human capital stop at age 16. Thus, the only
margin at which parents can buffer the negative shock of the school closures for children at that
age are inter-vivos transfers. At the same time, children cannot invest anything themselves into
their human capital at age 16. These two features make children of age 16 quite different from
the younger children in the model. In results documented in Appendix B, we consequently find
that the average earnings of children aged 16 decrease substantially by -1.7% based on the school
closures alone, and by even -1.9% once the pandemic-induced income shock is added, more than
for any other age group. The associated welfare losses are thus also very large, with -0.87%
and -1.12%, respectively.
5 Distributional Consequences: The Role of Parental
Characteristics
The aggregate results presented above mask important heterogeneity by parental characteristics.
We focus on two dimensions, parental education and net worth, and summarize the importance
of the heterogeneous effects by the dispersion in the CEV welfare measure (9). The results
concerning parental education are contained in Table 12, and Table 13 summarizes the results
concerning parental assets.
16We also conducted an experiment where we only considered the asymmetric shock to parental incomes,
and the effects in the whole experiment are almost identical to the sum of its parts—the sum of the effects
from the reduction of government investments only and the effects of the parental income reductions only.
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Focusing first on parental education, we observe that the welfare losses, as measured by the
CEV’s, from the Covid-19-induced school closures are largest (−0.7%) for children whose parents
are high school dropouts, and smallest (−0.57%) for children of college-educated parents. Thus,
higher parental education and the associated higher parental income partly shield children from
the negative impact of the school closures through positive investments and increased inter-vivos
transfers by their parents.
The differences by parental education become less pronounced if the economic shock of the
pandemic is added to the school closures, and now the group of children from high school
educated parents are the most affected (while children of college parents continue to be the
least affected). The reason is the reaction of inter-vivos transfers of parents to the shock, as
well as the induced educational decision of their offspring. With school closures and the income
recession, parents in the lower two education groups (s = no and s = hs) reduce their inter-vivo
transfers to their children, which are by contrast increased for children of parents with a college
degree. While the relative reduction is stronger for children of less than high-school parents,
the strong absolute reduction of inter-vivos transfers both hurts children of high school educated
parents directly (fewer assets) and also reduces the fraction of these children that decide to
obtain a college degree. This later, indirect effect is largely absent in the group of children
with parents of lowest educational attainment, because only a very small share of them would
go to college even before the Covid-19 crisis. In this precise sense, this group of children has
not much to lose from Covid-19-related school closures. This explains the non-monotonicity in
CEVs. Stating this differently, children from college-educated parents suffer less than children
from high school educated parents because their parents can successfully shield them by raising
their investment into them and increasing their inter-vivos transfers. By contrast, children from
less than high school educated parents suffer less than children of high school educated parents
because they have less to lose from the start, given that few of them attend college, which is a
major determinant of future income, and parental investments are small for them in the baseline.
Table 12: Welfare Consequences (CEVs) by Parental Education
Experiment/Parental Education s = no s = hs s = co
Lockdown of Schools -0.70% -0.68% -0.57%
Lockdown of Schools & Asymmetric Income Shock -0.71% -0.82% -0.65%
Notes: CEV: consumption equivalent variation of the welfare measure 9 by parental education s = no: less
than high school, s = hs: high school, s = co: college.
In Table 13, we delineate the distribution of the welfare consequences by parental net worth,
measured at the time children are born into the adult household. Recall from our description in
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Section 3 that this cross-sectional wealth distribution in the model is directly estimated from the
data. Whereas the differences in the welfare losses between net worth quintiles 2 to 4 are not
very pronounced, children of parents in the first wealth quintile experience quite strong welfare
losses of −0.8% from the school closures alone and of −1% from the full Covid19 crisis. In
contrast, the welfare losses of children in the highest asset quintile amount “only” to −0.54%
and −0.63%, respectively. This suggests that low wealth holdings and borrowing constraints of
parents are a strong impediment to parents trying to increase their private education resource
investments into their children, in response to the reduced governmental investment associated
with school closures.
Table 13: Welfare Consequences (CEVs) by Parental Assets
Experiment/Asset Quintile 1 2 3 4 5
Lockdown of Schools -0.80% -0.64% -0.64% -0.63% -0.54%
Lockdown of Schools & Asymmetric Income Shock -0.96% -0.72% -0.72% -0.72% -0.63%
Notes: CEV: consumption equivalent variation of the welfare measure 9 by parental asset quintiles 1− 5.
We thus far have documented that children of highly educated parents, and those with sub-
stantial net worth, experience lower relative welfare losses. What is thus the effect of school
closures on measures of intergenerational persistence? In fact, in our experiment with school
closures the coefficient in a regression of children’s education on parental education, or children’s
log earnings on parental log earnings, barely change, and even slightly decrease from 0.41 without
school closures to 0.40 with school closures in the education regression, or from 0.33 to 0.32 in
the earnings regression, respectively. In general, the directional change of inter-generational per-
sistence is ambiguous. On the one hand, we find that less well-off parents increase their absolute
monetary investment into children substantially less than better-off parents in reaction to the
school closures, which increases persistence. On the other hand, children of well-off parents have
more to lose when it comes to attending college, the major factor determining future earnings,
given that their initial college attendance rates are higher. Indeed, we find that college atten-
dance drops by -0.9 percentage points for children of college-educated parents (whose baseline
college attendance rate is 60.8%), but only by -0.1 percentage points for children of high-school
dropouts (whose baseline college attendance rate is a mere 4.7%). This effect decreases inter-
generational persistence. Thus, the effects on intergenerational education or earnings persistence
are ambiguous. In terms of welfare effects, however, there is a clear ranking with children from
better-off parents suffering smaller welfare losses than children with parents at the lower end of the
socio-economic distribution. The key to this finding are inter-vivos transfers. Whereas well-to-do
parents cannot completely offset the loss of human capital and thus the lower final educational
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attainment of their children caused by the school closures, they increase the inter-vivos transfers
to the children as an additional channel to buffer their welfare losses.17
6 Inspecting the Mechanisms
6.1 The Role of Parental Re-optimization
To understand the importance of the reaction of parents to the lockdown of schools, we analyze
the results of a model in which parental decisions are held constant. Thus, governmental inputs
fall due to the school closures, but parental inputs remain unchanged. As a consequence of
unchanged parental inputs, the pandemic-induced recession plays no role in this experiment.
Results for this experiment on aggregate effects are summarized in Table 14, which should be
compared to Panel A of Table 10. We observe that the aggregate effects are now substantially
larger than in the scenario of school closures with parental behavioral adjustments. The share
of college-educated children now decreases by -0.75 percentage points, rather than by -0.49
percentage points when parents react optimally to the school closures. Average earnings fall
by -1.7% rather than -0.9%, and the CEV associated with the school closures is now on average -
1.28% instead of -0.65%. Thus, by optimally adjusting their investment into children, parents
mitigate the welfare losses of their children caused by the school closures by around one half. Of
course, these adjustments are associated with (unreported) welfare losses to the parents.
We complement these results by additional decomposition analyses in Appendix B where we
hold constant one decision at a time. This exercise shows that the welfare losses of children by
parental education are lowest for children of college educated parents due to inter-vivos transfers.
Holding these constant leads to highest losses for children of college parents and lowest losses for
children of parents that themselves dropped out of high school. This also shows that the non-
monotonicity of welfare results by parental education in the recession experiment—with highest
losses accruing to children of high-school parents—disappears once the response of inter-vivos
transfers is shut down.
6.2 The Role of Asymmetric Income Shocks
Suppose that instead of the asymmetric distribution of the income shock, it would be symmetric
across households, i.e., the reduction in hours worked and the probability of transiting from a high
to a low income is the same during the lockdown for all education groups. With such symmetric
17Note that the same main results—namely essentially no change in intergenerational persistence, but
lower welfare losses for children of well-off parents—hold when the asymmetric income shock is added to the
school closures.
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Table 14: Aggregate Outcomes under Constant Decisions when Government Investments are
Reduced
baseline Change for Children of Biological Age
average 4 6 8 10 12 14
change in %p
share s = no 16.28 0.70 0.46 1.00 0.87 0.74 0.62 0.51
share s = hs 55.54 0.05 0.10 -0.08 -0.02 0.04 0.10 0.15
share s = co 28.18 -0.75 -0.56 -0.92 -0.85 -0.78 -0.72 -0.66
change in %
av HK 1.00 -2.01 -1.45 -2.43 -2.29 -2.14 -1.97 -1.77
av earn 0.65 -1.67 -1.34 -1.95 -1.85 -1.75 -1.64 -1.51
CEV [in %] - -1.28 -1.07 -1.51 -1.41 -1.32 -1.22 -1.13
Notes: This table is the analogue to table 10 where parental money and time investment decisions and inter-
vivos transfer decisions are held constant. This is computed by holding parental policy functions constant and
by aggregating with a hypothetical distribution of children over human capital computed under constant
decisions.
income shocks, we re-calibrate this probability to again generate a reduction of aggregate income
by 4.7%, as in our baseline income shock calibration. As a consequence, the probability of
transiting to the low income realization is now πldhl = 0.058, which is thus higher for college
households and lower for non-college households than in the baseline asymmetric income shock
scenario. Likewise, the average reduction of hours is now 4.3% for all households.
Table 15—which is the analogue to the last row of Table 12—summarizes the welfare con-
sequences of children by parental education. As a consequence of the lower incomes of parents
with a college degree under the symmetric income shocks, CEVs of children of these parents
display stronger welfare losses than in the asymmetric income shock experiment. Their average
welfare loss now amounts to −0.79% compared to −0.65%. On the other hand, welfare losses for
children of parents with a lower educational degree are slightly reduced compared to the previous
results. As a result, children of parents with less than a high school education experience the
smallest (absolute) welfare losses of all.
Table 15: Welfare Consequences (CEVs) with Symmetric Shocks
Experiment / Parental Education pLHS pHS pCL
Lockdown of Schools & Symmetric Income Shock -0.71% -0.80% -0.79%
Notes: This table is the analogue to the second row of Table 12 now assuming that the income shock is
symmetric across all parents.
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7 Are the Effects Non-linear? Prolonged School Clo-
sures & Recession
We now consider a prolonged closure of schools by one full year so that ig drops by 50% in
one model period. Likewise, we assume that the recession is twice as severe.18 Thus, we now
assume a drop of hours by 8.6% and an income drop of 9.4%. Table 15 summarizes the results
on CEVs showing that the welfare losses are more than twice as large than under the respective
previous experiments. With school closures alone, we now find a CEV of −1.44% compared
to −0.65% from above, and in the recession scenario we obtain a total effect of −1.65% compared
to −0.75%. This shows that the loss of human capital accumulation over the life-cycle not only
has long-lasting effects, but also that the effects on welfare are strictly convex in the size of the
shock.
Table 16: Welfare Consequences (CEVs) of Prolonged School Closure & Recession
Lockdown of Schools Lockdown of Schools & Asymmetric Income Shock
CEV -1.44% -1.65%
Notes: Column 1 shows the CEV if schools are closed for one year, column 2 if in addition the recession
lasts for one year with full recovery in the next year.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze the long-term welfare losses of children caused by the school closures in
the Covid19 crisis. We use a partial equilibrium model in which parents differ by marital status,
education, income, and assets. The human capital production function of children incorporates
governmental inputs through public schooling, as well as monetary and time investments by
parents. The Covid-19 crisis is modelled as leading to unexpected school closures of half a year.
We have three main results. First, the school closures alone lead to substantial reductions in
children’s welfare, with a consumption equivalent variation of on average -0.65%. Thus, these
temporary measures have substantial permanent effects on the welfare of children. Secondly,
for the affected children’s welfare, the school closures themselves are a more important facet of
the Covid-19 crisis than the negative shock to parental income: adding the negative shock to
parental in come, the consumption equivalent variation rises in absolute terms to -0.75%. Last,
18We thus assume that the deep recession the US experienced in the second quarter of 2020 continues for
one more quarter and that the drop of GDP is the same is in the first quarter and then, at the beginning of
2021, the US economy experiences a full recovery.
43
there is substantial heterogeneity in the welfare effects, with children of well-off parents fairing
better after the school closures than children of less well-off parents.
The results of this paper thus caution that the school closures have significant long-term
consequences on the affected children and especially affect the welfare of children from disadvan-
taged households negatively. Note that our model only incorporates the main direct effect of the
school closures on children that are caused by reduced public investment in human capital. There
potentially exist additional dimensions along which negative long-term consequences are to be
expected and which are not incorporated into our model. First, the lack of social contact during
the school closures could directly affect children’s welfare, but also their non-cognitive skills and
thereby their long-term wages. Secondly, parents who have to take care of their children during
the closures likely experienced increased stress that could affect the well-being of their children,
and might face a higher risk of job loss or fewer possibilities for career advancement (Alon et al.
(2020)), which could induce less investment into children in the coming years. On the other
hand, we model the school closures as a complete loss in schooling, while many schools tried to
maintain some form of schooling through distance learning and virtual teaching. Although these
measures might have reduced the long-term impact of the school closures, they likely exacerbated
the distributional consequences.
We conclude that school and child care closures should be considered as potentially very costly
measures to avoid the spread of the Corona virus. However, we want to clearly acknowledge that
we have not modelled the potential health benefits of these closures as this would require an
explicit model that links disease transmission to school activity. We hope to have provided
an informative model of the cost side and view the construction and quantification of such a
comprehensive model as a next desirable step for future research.
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A Theoretical Appendix
A.1 The Dynamic Investment Problem of Parental Households
During age bracket {jf , ..., jf + ja − 1} parents solve the problem
V (j, s,m, η; a, h) = max
c,im,it,a′,h′
{
u
(
c
1 + ζcξ(m, s) + 1m=maζa
)
− v
(
`(m) + κ(j) · ξ(m, s) · it
1 + 1m=maζa
)
+βEη′|η [V (j, s,m, η
′; a′, h′)]
}
subject to
a′ + c(1 + τ c) + ξ(m, s)im = a(1 + r(1− τ k)) + y(1− τ p)− T (y(1− 0.5τ p))
y = wε(s, j,m)η`(m)
a′ ≥ −a(j, s, k)
h′ = g(j, h, i)
i = i(im, it, ig)
and
h′ = g(j, h, i) =
(
κhjh
1− 1
σh + (1− κhj )i
1− 1
σh
) 1
1− 1
σh (10)
i = i(j, ig, ip) = Ā
(
κgj
(
ig
ı̄g
)1− 1
σg
+ (1− κgj )
(
ip
ı̄p
)1− 1
σg
) 1
1− 1
σg
(11)
ip = ip(j, im, it) =
(
κmj
(
im
ı̄m,d
)1− 1
σm
+ (1− κmj )
(
it
ı̄t,d
)1− 1
σm
) 1
1− 1
σm
, (12)
A.1.1 First Order and Envelope Conditions
Lagrange multipliers on budget constraint λb, on the borrowing constraint λa, on the law of motion
for human capital λh, the investment aggregator λi and the private investment aggregator λp.
 Consumption c
u′
(
c
1+ζcξ(m,s)+1m=maζa
)
1 + ζcξ(m, s) + 1m=maζa
= (1 + τc)λb
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 Assets a′
λb = βEη′|ηVa(x
′; a′, h′) + λa
 Human capital h′
λh = βEη′|ηVh(x
′; a′, h′)
 Human capital investment i
λi = λh
∂g(j, h, i)
∂i
 Private Investment aggregate ip
λp = λi
∂i(j, ig, ip, I)
∂ip
 Investment into private resources im
λbξ(m, s) = λp
∂ip(j, im, it)
∂im
 Investment in private time it
v′
(
`(m) + κ(j) · ξ(m, s) · it
1 + 1m=maζa
)
κ(j) · ξ(m, s)
1 + 1m=maζa
= λp
∂ip(j, im, it)
∂it
 Envelope condition with respect to to a
Va(x; a, h) = λb(1 + r(1− τ k))
 Envelope condition with respect to to h
Vh(x; a, h) = λh
∂g(j, h, i)
∂h
A.1.2 Optimality Conditions and Interpretation
The key choices parents make are a) how much to spend today and how much to save for the
future b) how much of that spending to devote to assets and how much to human capital and
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c) what is the optimal combination of time and monetary investment. The eventual question we
are interest in are comparative statics with respect to a fall in ig, a fall in income y and a change
in the stochastic process for η.
Intertemporal Optimality The intertemporal Euler equation is standard and reads as
(1 + τc)λb =
(1 + τc)Va(x; a, h)
(1 + r(1− τ k))
=
u′
(
c
1+ζcξ(m,s)+1m=maζa
)
1 + ζcξ(m, s) + 1m=maζa
≥ (1 + τc)βEη′|ηVa(x′; a′, h′)
= if a′ > −a
Thus we can state the intertemporal optimality condition in terms of the marginal utility of wealth
(ignoring the inequality coming from the borrowing constraint for a second)
Va(x; a, h) = (1 + r(1− τ k))βEη′|ηVa(x′; a′, h′)
or in terms of consumption, given that education and marital status do not change for a given
household
u′
(
c
1 + ζcξ(m, s) + 1m=maζa
)
= (1 + r(1− τ k))βEη′|ηu′
(
c′
1 + ζcξ(m, s) + 1m=maζa
)
Note that if the utility function is logarithmic, then
u′
(
c
1+ζcξ(m,s)+1m=maζa
)
1 + ζcξ(m, s) + 1m=maζa
=
1
c
and the Euler equation becomes
1 = (1 + r(1− τ k))βEη′|η
( c
c′
)
As always, a constant consumption tax drops out of the intertemporal optimality condition.
Optimal Investment in Human Capital Combining the first order conditions with respect
to
u′
(
c
1+ζcξ(m,s)+1m=maζa
)
(1 + τc)(1 + ζcξ(m, s) + 1m=maζa)
=
∂g(j, h, i)
∂i
∂i(j, ig, ip, I)
∂ip
∂ip(j, im, it)
∂im
βEη′|ηVh(x
′; a′, h′)
ξ(m, s)
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The left hand side is the marginal cost of reducing spending on consumption goods by one unit,
the right hand side gives the discounted benefits, per child, of one additional unit of the final
good being spent on education, where ∂g(j,h,i)
∂i
∂i(j,ig ,ip,I)
∂ip
∂ip(j,im,it)
∂im
is the marginal benefit of that
spending on human capital tomorrow, and Eη′|ηVh(x
′; a′, h′) is the expected marginal benefit of
a smarter child.
Optimal Allocation between Time and Money Taking the ratio between the optimality
conditions for time and money investment yields
(1 + τc)
κ(j)(1 + ζcξ(m, s) + 1m=maζa)
1 + 1m=maζa
v′
(
`(m)+κ(j)·ξ(m,s)·it
1+1m=maζa
)
u′
(
c
1+ζcξ(m,s)+1m=maζa
) = ∂ip(j,im,it)∂it
∂ip(j,im,it)
∂im
This equation simply states that the marginal rate of substitution between time and consumption
times its relative price (the consumption tax rate) equals the marginal rate of transformation in
the production of inputs for human capital production.
A.1.3 Functional Forms
Assume
u(c) = log(c)
v(x) =
x1+
1
ϕ
1 + 1
ϕ
h′ = g(j, h, i) =
(
κhjh
1− 1
σh + (1− κhj )i
1− 1
σh
) 1
1− 1
σh
i = i(j, ig, ip) = Ā
(
κgj
(
ig
ı̄g
)1− 1
σg
+ (1− κgj )
(
ip
ı̄p
)1− 1
σg
) 1
1− 1
σg
ip = ip(j, im, it) =
(
κmj
(
im
ı̄m,d
)1− 1
σm
+ (1− κmj )
(
it
ı̄t,d
)1− 1
σm
) 1
1− 1
σm
and thus the optimality condition for the relative inputs of time and resources is given by
(1 + τc)κ(j)
[`(m) + κ(j)ξ(m, s)it]
1
ϕ
(1 + 1m=maζa)
1+ 1
ϕ
· c =
1− κmj
κmj
(
ı̄m,d
ı̄t,d
)1− 1
σm
(
im
it
) 1
σm
This implies that in a recession, as goods become scarcer (c falls), households should shift away
from goods investment into human capital, and towards time investment. The impact of a
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reduction in public investment ig induces households to increase private investment, with the
optimal mix again given by the equation above
B Results Appendix
B.1 Children of Age 16
Table 17 shows the effects on inter-vivos transfers, acquired human capital at age 18 and average
earnings for children who are of age 16 in the period of the lockdown when they are about to leave
the adult household but parents may still decide on the inter-vivos transfers to these children.
The table also reports the CEV of the welfare function (9).
Table 17: Effects on Children of Age 16
Lockdown of Schools
av ivt HK age 18 av earn CEV [in %]
-1.30 -1.62 -1.73 -0.87
Lockdown of Schools & Asymmetric Income Shock
-2.12 -1.60 -1.92 -1.12
Notes: Effects on age 16 children. Percent changes for inter-vivos transfers (ivt), acquired human capital at
age 18, average earnings and the consumption equivalent variation of the welfare measure, cf. equation (9).
B.2 Decomposition of CEV
According to (9) the welfare of children of a given age is affected by changes of the distribution
along assets, human capital and the resulting endogenous education decision of the children.
Table 18 decomposes the CEV into these various components by subsequently switching off model
elements, in the first part of the table for the experiment with the school closures. As a first
step we hold constant inter-vivo transfers. Consequentially, the cross-sectional asset distribution
at age jc > j is not influenced by this element and the education decision of children is altered.
Comparison between columns 1 (which is the full model) and column 2 shows that the inter-
vivo transfers play a crucial role in the model. With them being constant, children of college
educated parents would lose in terms of welfare from the lockdown of schools. Also, with this
missing adjustment elements, the size of the CEV increases (in absolute value) relative to the
full model for all education groups. We subsequently switch off money and time investments
by parents in column 3 and, finally, also hold constant the education decision by children in
column 4 of the table. This shows that with each adjustment switched off the level of the CEV
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increases and the difference in the CEV between children from college parents and less than
high school parents becomes larger. The last experiment shows that the exogenous reduction of
time investments by the government into children and the induced human capital distribution has
strong welfare implications. The only channel through which welfare is adjusted in this experiment
is the fixed effects in earnings γ(s, h). Since the slope of the fixed effect in h increases in the
level of education, a reduction of human capital leads to the largest losses for those children with
the highest education (when the education choice is held constant), which explains the strong
education gradient observed in the last column of the table.
In the second part of the table we repeat this experiment for the additional recession scenario.
In that decomposition the only relevant changes appear when holding the inter-vivos transfers con-
stant because once those are constant the rest of the decomposition is identical to the one in the
school closure experiment. We observe that once the inter-vivos transfers are held constant again
the children of college youngsters experience the highest welfare losses and the non-monotonicity
of welfare results (that the children of high school parents experience the largest welfare losses)
is also gone.
Table 18: CEV Decomposition for Main Experiments
Lockdown of Schools
full model ivt const ivt, inv const ivt, inv, edu const
s = no -0.70% -0.80% -0.97% -1.63%
s = hs -0.68% -1.12% -1.29% -2.08%
s = co -0.57% -1.36% -1.54% -2.66%
Lockdown of Schools & Asymmetric Income Shock
s = no -0.71% -0.78% -0.97% -1.63%
s = hs -0.82% -1.13% -1.29% -2.08%
s = co -0.65% -1.37% -1.54% -2.66%
Notes: Decomposition of the CEV of welfare function 9. ivt const: inter-vivos transfers are held constant;
ivt, inv const: additionally, parental investments through money and time are held constant; ivt, inv const,
edu const: additionally, education decisions are held constant.
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